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ABSTRACT
The definitions of the bear, sidewalk and bull markets are ambigu-
ous in the existing literature. This makes it difficult for practi-
tioners to distinguish between different market conditions. In this
paper, we propose statistical definitions of the bear, sidewalk and
bull markets, which correspond to the three states in our hidden
semi-Markov model. We apply this analysis to the daily returns of
the Chinese stock market and seven developed markets. Using
the Viterbi algorithm to globally decode the most likely sequence
of the market conditions, we systematically find the precise timing
of the bear, sidewalk and bull markets for all the eight markets.
Through the comparison of the estimation and decoding results,
many unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market are
revealed, such as ‘crazy bull’, ‘frequent and quick bear’ and ‘no
buffer zone’. In China, the bull market is more volatile than in
developed markets, the bear market occurs more frequently than
in developed markets, and the sidewalk market has not func-
tioned as a buffer zone since 2005. Possible causes of these
unique characteristics are also discussed and implications for pol-
icy-making are suggested.
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The rules and structures of the Chinese stock market are considerably different from
those of developed stock markets. Firstly, the Chinese stock market is heavily influ-
enced by policy, rather than being market-orientated. The Chinese government is
extensively involved in the stock market and has imposed a number of special restric-
tions. Secondly, the Chinese stock market consists mainly of individual investors,
whereas institutional investors dominate in developed markets. Thirdly, the Chinese
stock market is still under development and lacks financial derivatives to manage risk.
For example, index futures and options trading in China is subject to a number of
restrictions, which makes them inaccessible for the majority of investors. It is worth-
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It is natural to ask how these different rules and structures might affect the market
behaviour. Many studies have investigated the Chinese stock market from different
perspectives. Herding behaviour, overreaction and speculation in the Chinese stock
market are well-documented. Tan et al. (2008) study the herding behaviour in the
Chinese stock market, including both A-share and B-share. They find that herding
happens in both upside and downside market conditions. Particularly, the herding
behaviour is stronger in upside market conditions in A-share. Investor sentiment and
its nonlinear effect on stock returns in China are studied by Ni, Wang, and Xue
(2015) through the panel quantile regression model. The nonlinear effect of investor
sentiment turns out to be asymmetric and reversal, which proves the occurrence of
overreaction in the Chinese stock market. In addition, they observe that Chinese
investors are affected by cognitive bias and speculation tendencies. In the literature,
however, very few works have studied the market behaviour from the perspective of
market conditions. To the best of our knowledge, the difference of the market condi-
tions between the Chinese stock market and developed markets is seldom addressed,
especially after 2005.
Market conditions have been studied mostly with Markov-switching techniques.
Schaller and Van Norden (1997) consider a two-regime model which allows the mean
and/or the variance of returns to vary in different regimes for the US stock market.
Nielsen and Olesen (2001) find that a third regime, the speculative market, exists in
some European markets. Girardin and Liu (2003) adopt a switch-in-the-mean plus
switch-in-the-variance (MSMH(3)-AR(5)) model for weekly capital gains on the
Shanghai A-share market during the period between 1995 and 2002. They also find
that there are three market conditions: a speculative market, a bull market and a bear
market. They claim that the bull market is always a buffer zone in the transition
between the other two market conditions. It should be noted that the buffer zone
defined in the research of Girardin and Liu (2003) is the bull market, while the side-
walk market is regarded as the buffer zone in this paper.
The hidden Markov model (HMM) and hidden semi-Markov model (HSMM) used
in financial studies focus on the reproduction of stylised facts of daily returns. Ryden,
Ter€asvirta, and Åsbrink (1998) firstly adopt a two-state HMM with normal distribu-
tions (zero mean but different variance) as the component distribution (a.k.a. mar-
ginal distribution) to reproduce most of the stylised facts of daily returns, except for
the slow decay in the autocorrelation function of squared returns. Bulla and Bulla
(2006) use a two-state HSMM, which is a generalisation of HMM, to model daily
returns of 18US sector indexes. The stylised facts of daily returns are reproduced by
HSMM, including the long memory in the autocorrelation function of squared
returns. Liu and Wang (2017) use a three-state HSMM on the daily returns of CSI
300 and show that the stylised facts of daily returns in China also can be reproduced.
Their empirical results suggest that three-state HSMM is appropriate for the CSI 300,
and it is better than two-state HSMM, three-state HMM, two-state HMM and
GARCH(1,1) model. In this paper, we follow Liu and Wang (2017) to employ the
three-state HSMM to systematically find the precise timing of the bear, sidewalk and
bull markets.
This paper aims to statistically identify the unique characteristics of the market















































2 Z. LIU AND S. WANG
The definitions of the bear, sidewalk and bull markets are very vague in the existing
literature, making it difficult for practitioners to distinguish between stock markets in
different market conditions. In this paper, we propose statistical definitions of the
bear, sidewalk and bull markets, which correspond to the states in our three-state
HSMM. We apply this analysis to the daily returns of the Chinese stock market and
seven developed markets. Using the Viterbi algorithm (Viterbi 1967) to globally
decode the most likely sequence of the market conditions, we systematically find the
precise timing of the bear, sidewalk and bull markets for all the eight markets.
Through the comparison of the estimation and decoding results, several unique char-
acteristics of the Chinese stock market are found, such as ‘crazy bull’, ‘frequent and
quick bear’ and ‘no buffer zone’. ‘Crazy bull’ refers to a considerably high variance in
the bull market. ‘Frequent and quick bear’ means that the bear market has a short
sojourn time and occurs very frequently. ‘No buffer zone’ describes that the bull
market is typically mixed with the bear market and there is no sidewalk market
between them.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. This paper first reviews the
key differences between the Chinese stock market and developed markets. In the
methodology part, the statistical definitions of the bear, sidewalk and bull markets are
proposed. We then introduce the HSMM that we will subsequently use. In the empir-
ical results part, the unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market are identified
by comparing estimation and decoding results with developed markets. Finally, the
possible causes of the unique characteristics are discussed and several policy implica-
tions are suggested.
Review of the Chinese stock market
The Chinese stock market is heavily influenced by policies, rather than being market-
oriented. The Chinese government is considerably involved in the stock market and
intervenes frequently. Policies on the Chinese stock market are unstable. For example,
in addition to price limits, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
imposed ‘Circuit Breaker’ on 1 January 2016. In China, the ‘Circuit Breaker’ mechan-
ism depends on the abnormal movement of the market index (CSI 300). Specifically,
the trading of stocks and relevant derivatives will be suspended for 15minutes if the
market index rises/drops 5%, and the trading will be stopped for the rest of the day if
the market index rises/drops 7%. After the launch of the ‘Circuit Breaker’, it was acti-
vated twice in the first week. Because of complaints from investors, the Chinese gov-
ernment abandoned this mechanism on 8 January 2016.
In China, individual investors make up 82.24% of total trading volume in 2013
(Han and Li 2017), whereas institutional investors dominate in developed markets.
Most individual investors focus on price changes and are less concerned with funda-
mental economic and firm-level information. The turnover rate in the Chinese stock
market is much higher than that in developed markets, implying that a large propor-
tion of trading activities are speculative rather considered as investments. Many indi-
vidual investors are heavily influenced by market rumours. Individual investors tend
to follow the news and purchase stocks in a herding manner (Tan et al. 2008), which















































ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 3
There is a lack of risk management tools in the Chinese stock market. As a matter of
fact, short-selling stocks in China are still limited and investors can mainly buy stocks.
Index futures are supposed to be a suitable tool to hedge downside risk. However, the
Chinese regulator imposed various restrictions on trading index futures in August 2015
because it suspected that some investors participated in ‘malicious’ short selling of
index futures. Many private funds and security firms were under investigation for bet-
ting on a market drop. As a result, the trading volume of the index futures shrank sub-
stantially. For example, IF1509 had a trading volume of 2.42 million contracts on 25
August 2015, but it dropped to 3,810 on 7 September 2015. Utilising index futures to
manage risk is still subject to a number of restrictions (e.g. no more than 10 contracts
are allowed to open). Due to restrictions on domestic index futures markets, investors
are not able to freely trade index futures. Many investors tend to trade Chinese index
futures products in foreign markets, like the FTSE China A50 index futures on the
Singapore Exchange and E-mini FTSE China 50 index futures on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange. This has caused an outflow of capital from China.
During 2015, it has been observed that fund-matching activities are very active.
Fund matching refers to borrow funds from trust companies, structured mutual fund
companies and other sources. Unlike margin loan and margin financing, the regula-
tion on fund matching is much less strict, which can be an essential cause of the high
leverage. For example, umbrella trusts are not required to register with the China
Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation. Umbrella trusts contain two sorts of
tranches. Banks purchase the senior tranches, which guarantee fixed returns.
Subordinate tranches are sold to private clients, like wealthy individuals, private com-
panies and fund-matching companies, and provide uncertain returns depending on
the performance of the wealth management product. In other words, subordinate
tranches would get the rest of investment profits. Jiang (2014) claims that the
Minsheng Bank, China Everbright Bank and China Merchants Bank were heavily
involved in the business of umbrella trusts. There are no accurate data about the size
of umbrella trusts but some estimations indicate that they accounted for roughly 200
billion RMB by the end of 2014 (Hsu 2015). In favour of high interest rates, fund-
matching companies lend funds to investors by providing margin loans without
sufficient consideration of risk. Yap (2015) points out that by 30 June 2015, fund-
matching companies channelled 500 billion RMB from opening multiple and subdi-
vided securities accounts with brokerages. These fund-matching companies were
seldom regulated until CSRC imposed restrictions on them in July 2015.
Methodology
Defining bear, sidewalk and bull markets
In practice, investors tend to determine market conditions arbitrarily and different
conclusions might be drawn for the same market in the same period. In the existing
academic literature, the definition of market conditions varies considerably. In one of
the early studies, Fabozzi and Francis (1977) propose three ways to define market
conditions. The first way is to distinguish bull and bear markets (BB): it defines















































4 Z. LIU AND S. WANG
rises near the bearish periods are treated as part of the bear market. The second way
defines up and down markets (UD): months in which return was non-negative are
defined as up months, and months in which return was negative are defined as down
months. And the third way is about substantial up and down months (SUD): months
when the market moves up substantially, months when the market moves down sub-
stantially, and months when the market moves neither up substantially nor down sub-
stantially, but the threshold for a substantial move is arbitrarily defined.
In more recent studies, a loose definition by Chauvet and Potter (2000) proposes
that market prices generally increase (decrease) in a bull (bear) market. Edwards and
Caglayan (2001) simply define that bull market months are those in which the S&P
index rises by 1% or more, and bear market months are those in which the S&P index
falls by 1% or above. Lunde and Timmermann (2004) claim that a bull (bear) market
starts when the market price increases (decreases) by a certain percentage, e.g. 20%,
from the previous local bottom (peak). Gonzalez et al. (2006) utilise two formal turning
point methods to detect the timing of BB. Cheng, Lee, and Lin (2013) define bull (bear)
markets as the periods with at least three consecutive months of positive (negative)
returns.
It is necessary to propose our own definition of market conditions for three rea-
sons. Firstly, there is no generally accepted definition of the market conditions.
Secondly, the market conditions are mostly defined based on monthly data. Finally
and most importantly, the current definitions are usually based on a dichotomy, i.e.
the bull and the bear market (or the up and the down market). The only exception is
the SUD in Fabozzi and Francis (1977), but their threshold for a substantial move is
arbitrarily defined. In contrast, we systemically define the bear, sidewalk and bull
market conditions from the perspective of distributional features.
Definition bear market
 The mean of the distribution of the daily returns conditional on the bear market
should be less than 0.
 It is expected that the frequency of negative returns is larger than that of positive
returns.
 Due to the above distributional features, the market prices in the bear market are
generally falling.
Definition sidewalk market
 The mean of the distribution of the daily returns conditional on the sidewalk
market should be very close to 0.
 It is expected that roughly an equal number of positive and negative returns are
observed.
 Due to the above distributional features, market prices stay within a certain band
and show a mean reversion pattern.
Definition bull market
 The mean of the distribution of the daily returns conditional on the bull market















































ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 5
 The frequency of positive returns is expected to be larger than that of negative
returns.
 Due to the above distributional features, market prices in the bull market are gen-
erally rising.
In straightforward notation, the mean in each market is as follows:
lðStÞ ¼ l1<0; if St ¼ 1 ð‘bear’ marketÞ
lðStÞ ¼ l20; if St ¼ 2 ð‘sidewalk’ marketÞ
lðStÞ ¼ l3 > 0; if St ¼ 3 ð‘bull’ marketÞ
The variance of each market can be denoted as
r2ðStÞ ¼ r21; if St ¼ 1 ð‘bear’ marketÞ
r2ðStÞ ¼ r22; if St ¼ 2 ð‘sidewalk’ marketÞ
r2ðStÞ ¼ r23; if St ¼ 3 ð‘bull’ marketÞ
where we expect that the bear market should have the highest variance (i.e. r21 > r
2
2
and r21 > r
2
3) because it is normally the most volatile market.
Hidden semi-Markov model
The HSMM is an extension of the HMM by explicitly specifying the sojourn time
(a.k.a. dwell time, occupancy time, duration time) distribution. The underlying state
process is a semi-Markov chain. HSMM was originally introduced in the 1980s for
speech recognition and now has a wide range of applications in the areas of, e.g.
handwriting recognition, functional MRI brain mapping and network anomaly detec-
tion. Yu (2010) provides a comprehensive review of HSMM, including parameter esti-
mation, model inference and applications.
HSMM is comprised of two processes, the unobservable state process, s1; s2; :::; sT
and the observation process x1; x2; :::; xT . Each state has a sequence of observation.
The sojourn time is explicitly defined by the sojourn time distribution.
The component distribution that produces a sequence of observations with length
d starting at time t þ 1 is shown as:
bi;dðxtþ1:tþdÞ ¼ Pðxtþ1:tþdjs½tþ1:tþd ¼ iÞ (1)
where i is one of the states (i.e. i 2 f1; 2; :::;mg); xtþ1:tþd stands for the sequence of
observation from time t þ 1 to t þ d; and s½tþ1:tþd represents the sequence of states
starting at time t þ 1 and ending at t þ d, inclusive. In other words, State i that begins
at t þ 1 produces a sequence of d observations.
The state transition probability that State i of length d enters into State j of length
d' is defined in Equation (2):
cði;dÞðj;d0Þ ¼ Pðs½tþ1:tþd0  ¼ jjs½td1:t ¼ iÞ (2)
where i and j belong to one of the states (i.e. i; j 2 f1; 2; :::;mg). After staying in State















































6 Z. LIU AND S. WANG
The transition from one state to the same state itself is 0, i.e. cði;dÞði;d0Þ ¼ 0. Hence, the
diagonal elements in the transition probability matrix (TPM) are zeros. The entries in
TPM need to be associated with its sojourn time. The definition of TPM for HSMM
is presented in Equation (3):
C ¼
0 cð1;d1Þð2;d2Þ    cð1;d1Þðm;dmÞ












The summation of the rows in TPM has to be 1. The sojourn time is di,
i 2 f1; 2; :::;mg, for each state follows its sojourn time distribution. The sojourn time
distribution is defined in Equation (4):
diðuÞ ¼ Pðstþuþ1 6¼ j; s½tþ1:tþu ¼ jjstþ1 ¼ j; st 6¼ jÞ (4)
Following Bulla and Bulla (2006), we adopt the right-censored type HSMM because
the assumption of the classical HSMM that the last observation always coincides with
the exit from a state does not seem to be realistic for financial time series data.
For our empirical study, we adopt the three-state HSMM with normal distributions
as component distributions. The three states in the HSMM are expected to corres-
pond to the bear, sidewalk and bull markets. The normal distribution is simple and
fits our data well. The sojourn time distribution is set to be a logarithmic distribution
because it only has one parameter and maintains the simplicity of the model.
Estimations are carried out using the EM algorithm. The Viterbi algorithm is
employed to globally decode the most likely sequence of states based on the data
observed. Bulla, Bulla, and Nenadic (2010) provide a basis implementation of HSMM
as an R package.Q1 Our implementation is based on their package.
Empirical results
Data description
We apply the three-state HSMM to analyse the daily returns of stock indexes in eight
countries, including the CSI 300 (China), S&P 500 (United States), FTSE 100 (United
Kingdom), CAC 40 (France), DAX (Germany), Nikkei 225 (Japan), STI (Singapore)
and ASX 200 (Australia). The sample period is from 8 April 2005 to 26 February
2016, slightly more than a decade. The reason for using this sample period is that the
start date is when the CSI 300 was first launched. There are 2,645 observations for
each index. The source of our data is Wind.
The daily return is defined as 100 times the first-order difference of the natural
logarithm of the closing price series:
rit ¼ 100 ðlnðPitÞ  lnðPit1ÞÞ (5)















































ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 7
Component distribution: evidence of ‘crazy bull’
It is natural to interpret the three states in our HSMM as bear, sidewalk and bull
according to our definition based on statistical features of return distributions. The esti-
mated parameters of the component distribution in HSMM for all the countries under
study are presented in Table 1. The means of State 1 in all these countries are less than
zero and their variances are the highest among the three states. The statistical features
of State 1 are consistent with a bear market. It can be observed that the means in State
2 are all close to and slightly less than zero. The variance in State 2 is much lower than
in State 1. The statistical features of State 2 meet our expectation of a sidewalk market,
in which the return distribution should have a mean close to zero, enabling the price in
the sidewalk market to fluctuate within a band. State 3 for all the countries have posi-
tive means, with the smallest variance among all of the states, except for the CSI 300.
The return distribution with positive mean and small variance allows the price in the
bull market to increase steadily, which is an intrinsic feature of a bull market.
The first unique characteristic of the ‘crazy bull’ is the abnormally high variance in
the Chinese bull market compared with other countries. The Chinese bull market has
a variance of 2.058, almost three times higher than that of other countries. Japan has
the second most unstable bull market with a variance of 0.693. The bull markets in
the United States and the United Kingdom are relatively more stable, as indicated by
the small variances of 0.244 and 0.297, respectively.
It is reasonable to expect that the variance is higher in the bear market for all the
eight countries since the abrupt price fall during the market crash increases volatility.
The bear markets in all the eight countries show similarly high variances. The vari-
ance in the Chinese bear market (9.719) is modest, between the highest variance in
Japan (16.169) and the lowest in Australia (6.680). It seems that the volatility of the
Chinese bear is normal.
There is no significant difference between the sidewalk markets of the eight coun-
tries. Interestingly, the means in the sidewalk markets are close to 0 but consistently
slightly less than 0. In Table 2, one-sample t-statistics show that none of the eight
countries has a mean in State 2 which is significantly different from 0.
Sojourn time: evidence of ‘frequent and quick bear’
Based on the global decoding results, Table 3 reports the number of days, number of















































Table 1. Component distribution.
State 1 (Bear) State 2 (Sidewalk) State 3 (Bull)
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance
CSI 300 0.513 (9.719) 0.020 (1.343) 0.614 (2.058)
S&P 500 0.140 (8.726) 0.042 (1.375) 0.115 (0.244)
FTSE 100 0.245 (9.346) 0.018 (1.427) 0.082 (0.297)
CAC 40 0.330 (11.611) 0.051 (2.219) 0.123 (0.526)
DAX 0.316 (10.180) 0.018 (1.920) 0.187 (0.393)
Nikkei 225 0.382 (16.169) 0.056 (2.311) 0.156 (0.693)
STI 0.084 (8.831) 0.053 (1.644) 0.061 (0.348)
ASX 200 0.304 (6.680) 0.040 (1.449) 0.098 (0.412)
8 Z. LIU AND S. WANG
during our sample period. Compared with developed markets, the Chinese stock mar-
ket shows the characteristics of ‘quick bull’, ‘frequent and quick bear’ and ‘long
sidewalk’.
It should be highlighted that the average sojourn time of the bull market in China
(27.72) is the shortest, while for developed markets it is more than 40 trading days.
During our sample period, the Chinese market was in the bull market for 693 trading
days, but entered and exited the bull market 25 times. We find that the United States
is also in the bull market for a large number of times (27). However, the total number
of days when the United States is in the bull market (1,133) is nearly double that of

























































Table 3. Days, times and average sojourn.
State 1 (Bear) State 2 (Sidewalk) State 3 (Bull)
CSI 300
Number of days 570 1,381 693
Number of times 22 6 25
Average sojourn 25.91 230.17 27.72
S&P 500
Number of days 269 1,242 1,133
Number of times 3 30 27
Average sojourn 89.67 41.40 41.96
FTSE 100
Number of days 166 1,486 992
Number of times 7 21 14
Average sojourn 23.71 70.76 70.86
CAC 40
Number of days 174 1,483 987
Number of times 5 18 13
Average sojourn 34.80 82.39 75.92
DAX
Number of days 217 1,612 815
Number of times 3 21 18
Average sojourn 72.33 76.76 45.28
Nikkei 225
Number of days 104 1,607 933
Number of times 5 16 10
Average sojourn 20.80 100.44 93.30
STI
Number of days 213 938 1,493
Number of times 4 16 12
Average sojourn 53.25 58.63 124.42
ASX 200
Number of days 188 1,251 1,205
Number of times 4 16 11
Average sojourn 47.00 78.19 109.55
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 9
China along with the United Kingdom and Japan are found to have a short average
sojourn in the bear market, while the other five countries have more than 30 trading
days. It should be pointed out that China was in the bear market 22 times, while all
of the other countries were in the bear market around five times in our sample
period. We can argue that the ‘quick bear’ happens in the United Kingdom and Japan
but not frequently, while China has a ‘frequent and quick bear’.
The average sojourn of the sidewalk market in China is 230.17, more than twice
that of other countries. In addition, China was in the sidewalk market only six times
in the sample period. Every time China entered the sidewalk market, the long-term
trend in the stock market cannot be established unless the long sojourn in the side-
walk market has elapsed. The most obvious sidewalk period in China is from 2011 to
2014, where the CSI 300 stayed roughly between 2,000 and 3,000. During that period,
whenever the CSI 300 was near the ceiling or floor, it would eventually return to the
band again.
Transition probability matrix: evidence of ‘no buffer zone’
We find a very unique characteristic, the ‘no buffer zone’, of the Chinese stock market
from the estimated TPM in Table 4. The direct transition probability from the bear
market to bull market (or the opposite direction) is close to 0% in all developed mar-
kets. It is clearly shown that all developed markets always have the sidewalk market
as a buffer zone between the bull and the bear market. Nevertheless, the TPM in
China is very special with a particularly high-transition probability from the bear
market to the bull market (nearly 100%) and a relatively high-transition probability
from the bull market to the bear market (77.05%). The buffer zone effect was not















































Table 4. Transition probability matrix.
From/To State 1 (Bear) State 2 (Sidewalk) State 3 (Bull)
CSI 300 State 1 (Bear) 0.00% 0.04% 99.96%
State 2 (Sidewalk) 48.45% 0.00% 51.55%
State 3 (Bull) 77.05% 22.95% 0.00%
S&P 500 State 1 (Bear) 0.00% 99.90% 0.10%
State 2 (Sidewalk) 5.18% 0.00% 94.82%
State 3 (Bull) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
FTSE 100 State 1 (Bear) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
State 2 (Sidewalk) 14.61% 0.00% 85.39%
State 3 (Bull) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
CAC 40 State 1 (Bear) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
State 2 (Sidewalk) 13.10% 0.00% 86.90%
State 3 (Bull) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
DAX State 1 (Bear) 0.00% 99.93% 0.07%
State 2 (Sidewalk) 7.81% 0.00% 92.19%
State 3 (Bull) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Nikkei 225 State 1 (Bear) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
State 2 (Sidewalk) 20.33% 0.00% 79.67%
State 3 (Bull) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
STI State 1 (Bear) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
State 2 (Sidewalk) 17.89% 0.00% 82.11%
State 3 (Bull) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
ASX 200 State 1 (Bear) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
State 2 (Sidewalk) 16.88% 0.00% 83.12%
State 3 (Bull) 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
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market and the bear market is typical. It is found that the bull market and the bear
market are mixed together many times in the Chinese stock market.
The second difference between the TPM of China and other countries is that in
China the transition probability from sidewalk market to the other two markets is
roughly 50%, while other developed markets tend to have a much larger probability
to be a bull maket after exiting the sidewalk market. The developed market normally
has a probability of less than 20% for exiting the sidewalk market to the bear market.
Though this might be due to the short sample period of our data, this is what actually
happened in the last decade, including the four stages of the economic and business
cycle, namely economic prosperity before 2007, the financial crisis in 2008, financial
depression since 2009 and economic rebound after 2010.
Discussion and policy implications
Through the comparison with international markets, we find many unique character-
istics of the Chinese stock market. The most prominent three characteristics are ‘crazy
bull’, ‘frequent and quick bear’ and ‘no buffer zone’. All of these characteristics indi-
cate that the Chinese stock market is much more volatile than other developed mar-
kets. These three characteristics are of great importance for policymakers. In order to
build a more reliable and stable stock market, we would like to discuss the possible
causes of the unique characteristics and policy implications from our findings.
‘Crazy bull’ – rational security analysis and investor structure adjustment
Compared with developed markets, the Chinese stock market has considerably high
variance in the bull market, which may be induced by the herding behaviour of indi-
vidual investors. Kim and Wei (2002) provide evidence that individual investors are
more likely to engage in herding. Kumar and Lee (2006) use more than 1.85 million
individual investor transactions at a major US discount brokerage house to show that
individual investors buy or sell stocks in concert during 1991–1996. Moreover, indi-
vidual investors can be easily influenced by news and market sentiment. Barber and
Odean (2007) test and confirm that individual investors are net buyers of ‘attention-
grabbing stocks’.
In order to mitigate the herding behaviour, Lao and Singh (2011) suggest that large
financial institutions can bring more rational security analysis to the general public,
which can decrease speculative investments by individual investors. Most individual
investors have little knowledge of stock markets and focus on short-term price
changes, rather than the fundamental values of listed companies. It is imperative to
guide individual investors to focus on the fundamental values of firms and make
rational investments.
In China, individual investors account for 82.24% of the total trading volume in
2013 (Han and Li 2017), whereas institutional investors dominate in developed mar-
kets. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) show that stocks with greater institutional ownership
are priced more efficiently. The Chinese government needs to adjust investor struc-
ture and promote the development of institutional investors, such as asset manage-















































ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 11
knowledge and skills to manage professional investments that seek long-term returns
under proper risk management.
‘Frequent and quick bear’ – risk management tools
In China, the bear market has a short sojourn time and occurs very frequently. As a
matter of fact, short selling is limited in the Chinese stock market. Most investors can
only buy stocks in China. Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2009) point out that mispric-
ing can hardly be arbitraged at both the market level and the individual stock level in
a market with stringent constraints on short selling. It is very difficult to hedge down-
side risk during the bear market.
Index futures are appropriate tools to hedge downside risk during a bear market.Q2
Lien and Tse (2000) utilise futures contracts to develop a hedge strategy that mini-
mises the lower partial moments. Lien and Tse (2002) review the theoretical back-
ground and econometric implementation of various futures hedging. Chen, Lee, and
Shrestha (2003) investigate different theoretical methods to find optimal futures hedge
ratios.
Although the China Financial Futures Exchange launched the first index futures
product, the CSI 300 index futures, on 16 April 2010, the trading of index futures is
under strict restrictions. Firstly, there are high barriers for individual investors to par-
ticipate because of the high deposit requirement and the minimum account size
requirement. Secondly, the margin requirement is 15–18%, much higher than that of
index futures in developed countries. Thirdly, qualified foreign institutional investors
are not eligible to trade index futures.
In July 2015, more restrictions on index futures trading were enforced which have
hampered the development of financial markets. The strictest rule is that the number
of opening contracts cannot exceed 10 per day. As a result, investors can hardly use
the index futures as a tool to manage risk. In order to develop the Chinese stock mar-
ket, it is crucial to remove restrictions on the trading of domestic index futures prod-
ucts for investors to hedge the downside risk during frequent bear markets. In this
way, the Chinese stock market can stay on the promised path of reform to become
more market-oriented rather than policy-oriented.
‘No buffer zone’ – restriction on leverage
The most notable characteristic of the Chinese stock market is that the bull market is
typically mixed with the bear market and that there is no sidewalk market between
them. In developed markets, the sidewalk market always functions as the ‘buffer zone’
between the bear market and the bull market. The ‘no buffer zone’ phenomenon can
be explained by the overreaction effect in behavioural finance. Bondt and Thaler
(1985) find that most investors usually overreact to unexpected and dramatic news,
suggesting the existence of weak-form market inefficiencies. Wang and Yu (2004)
examine the overreaction effect in China during the period from 1994 to 2000 and
find that overreaction is most pronounced in the A-share market.
More importantly, Hsu (2015) points out that the excess leverage from fund
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market encountered a frenzied bull and then a dismal bear, which increased volatility
to a historically high level. It is highly likely that the abnormally high volatility was
caused by excess leverage, specifically through fund matching, like umbrella trusts and
fund-matching companies. By margin loan and margin financing, brokerages can
increase funding by up to twice the margin (i.e. ratio at 1:2). Through umbrella trusts,
one may leverage up to five times the margin (i.e. ratio at 1:5).
The excess leverage of fund matching exaggerates the downside risk of the Chinese
stock market, which caused the contagion of the market crisis. It is inevitable that
detailed regulation needs to be imposed on umbrella trusts and fund-matching com-
panies. There should be strict rules in the banking sector to provide funding for
umbrella trusts. Leverage should be capped at a much lower level. The monitoring of
fund-matching companies needs to be significantly reinforced. Finally, information on
fund matching should be more transparent to the public.
Conclusion
In this paper, we first review the special features of the Chinese stock market and
then a three-state HSMM is employed to decode its market conditions and those of
seven developed markets. Comparing the estimation and global decoding results, we
find three unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market, namely ‘crazy bull’,
‘frequent and quick bear’ and ‘no buffer zone’. ‘Crazy bull’ refers to the fact that the
variance of the bull market in the Chinese stock market is noticeably higher than that
of developed markets. ‘Frequent and quick bear’ is implied by the fact that the bull
market occurs frequently in China and the sojourn time of the Chinese bull market is
short. ‘No buffer zone’ is the most prominent characteristic. It is observed that the
sidewalk in developed markets always functions as a buffer zone between the bear
and bull markets, while this never occurs in China.
Our findings are meaningful for investors and policymakers at two levels. Firstly,
at the microlevel, investors have more in-depth understanding of the Chinese stock
market, which has several prominent differences from developed markets. In China,
the bull market is more volatile, the bear market happens more frequently, and the
sidewalk market does not function as a buffer zone. All of these characteristics suggest
that investors need to carefully manage the risk of their investment and avoid specula-
tion. Secondly, at the macrolevel, it is very important for the Chinese government to
adjust the investor structure, to provide risk management tools and to strengthen
supervision on the excess leverage from fund matching. However, the limitation of
this paper is that our sample period is not long enough and daily returns may contain
noise. Moreover, other frequencies of return could be used to conduct robustness
checking. Further work could be done based on an abnormal return, rather than the
original raw daily returns.
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